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Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya through Value
Complexity: Assessment of Being Kenyan Being Muslim
Abstract
Being Kenyan Being Muslim (BKBM) is an intervention that counters violent extremism and
other forms of intergroup conflict through promoting value complexity. BKBM was trialled
in Eastleigh, Nairobi, Kenya with a group of twenty-four participants of Kenyan and Somali
ethnicities; eight participants were identified as vulnerable to extremism, six of these were
former al Shabaab members. This article provides an empirical assessment of the
effectiveness of the BKBM course. The new BKBM course follows the structure of the Being
Muslim Being British course that exposes participants to the multiplicity of value priorities
that influential Muslims embody, and structures group activities that allow participants to
explore all value positions on issues central to extremist discourse and relevant to events in
Kenya, free from criticism or social pressure. The intervention, a sixteen-contact-hour
course using films and group activities that enable participants to problem solve on
extremism-related topics according to a broad array of their own values, was pre and post
tested with twenty-four participants (twenty-two of whom completed the full assessments),
(mean age 29.6, SD = 6.27). As hypothesized, Integrative Complexity (IC) increased
significantly by the end of the course in written verbal data, and there was clear evidence
of ability to perceive some validity in different viewpoints (achieving differentiation) in all
oral participant presentations at the end of the course.
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Introduction
Our theoretic starting point is that the wider context for radicalisation and
involvement in violent extremism (RIVE) is the interpenetration of cultures
arising from globalization, which can increase a sense of threat to different
cultural groups’ value priorities. When groups feel that their values or
worldview are threatened by the presence of other cultural worldviews, this
can lead to a defensive retrenchment to a value monist position that conserves
cultural or religious traditions.1 This maintains markers of social identity
with the effect of highlighting differences between social groups, in
accordance with social identity theory and social identity complexity theory.2
While this protects people from uncertainty about identity and behavioural
norms in the face of the competing value priorities of different cultures, it also
reduces their complexity of thinking concerning intergroup relations.3
Groups that are already primed to see their social world with low complexity
are more easily attracted to the very low complexity, black and white, us
versus them, extremist ideologies that are undergirded by value monism: one
value must be realized above all others (the value the radicalizers themselves
define per issue).4
Radical groups ride on the normal defensive retrenchment to value monism
and lowered complexity of thinking in the face of globalization threats, and
work to intensify it through their ideology. The low complexity of extremist
ideology has been substantiated by linguistic analysis (including integrative
complexity analyses), with al-Qaida-related extremism showing the lowest
complexity.5 The normal tendency to prefer one’s own ingroup, seen in social
identity studies using the Minimal Group paradigm are further intensified
through extremists’ ‘us versus them’ binary constructions.6 Extremist groups
that employ a narrative explaining the social world as powerfully arrayed
against the ingroup’s interests can offer, for some, a pathway to belonging,
significance and a purported means to address grievances. A period of
sequestration from family and friends and total commitment to the extremist
group is the usual further step that precedes involvement in violent strikes.7
Our recent assessment of the Being Muslim Being British intervention
supports the idea that increasing the complexity with which people think
about the issues that radicalizers exploit reduces vulnerability to extremist

1 Inglehart, R. and C. Wezel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human
Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
2 S. Roccas and M.B. Breir, “Social Identity Complexity”, Personality and Social Psychology
Review 6:2 (2002): 88-106.
3 Michael A. Hogg, "Uncertainty and extremism: Identification with high entitativity groups
under conditions of uncertainty," in Vincent Yzerbyt, Charles M. Judd, and Olivier Corneille
(eds.), The psychology of group perception: Perceived variability, entitativity, and
essentialism (New York: Psychology Press, 2004).
4 Ibid.
5 Peter Suedfeld, Peter, Ryan Cross, Ryan and Caron Logan. “Can Thematic Analysis Separate
the Pyramid of Ideas from the Pyramid of Actions? A Comparison Among Different Degrees of
Commitment to Violence,” in Dr. Hriar Cabayan (JS/J-39), Dr. Valerie Sitterle (GTRI), and
LTC Matt Yandura (JS/J-39) (eds.) Looking Back, Looking Forward: Perspectives on
Terrorism and Responses to It, Strategic Multi-layer Assessment White Paper (Pentagon,
September 2013), 61-68.
6 Tajfel, Henri, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981).
7 J. Ginges, S. Atran, S. Sachdeva and D. Medin, “Psychology out of the Laboratory: The
Challenge of Violent Extremism” American Psychologist 66 (2011): 507–519.
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messages, as a broad-based form of primary prevention.8 That method, which
we have applied here to the Being Kenyan Being Muslim intervention
operationalizes relevant value conflicts while providing the resources for
people to apply a wider spread of their own values, which in turn promotes
thinking complexity.9 Our approach is inspired by Isaiah Berlin who posits
that human values (e.g. freedom, equality, security, achievement, tradition,
etc.) are all equally important and desirable. Values motivate behaviour and
decisions; they organize cultural identity and bring significance to human
life.10 Yet, due to limited resources or cultural constraints, individuals have
to make choices: they often have to prioritise one value over the other, as any
life context makes it extremely difficult to maximize all human values equally.
Differences in value hierarchies between individuals and groups can be a
source of conflict unless people are able to perceive some validity in the
different value priorities of others, even if those don’t agree with their own
value hierarchies.11
The role that complexity in thinking plays in prevention of RIVE is supported
by the finding that engineers, graduates of a field centered on problems that
have a single, clear-cut, black and white answer, are significantly overrepresented among violent extremists.12 Further, research based on extensive
fieldwork with violent extremists shows that sacred values, defined
structurally by the impossibility for any co-mingling with other values, play a
key role in motivating the actions of extremists.13 Our approach to primary
prevention draws upon these lines of research and considers that, whatever
pathway towards RIVE has been taken, what extremist ideologies have in
common is a simple binary structure (‘us versus them’, ‘right versus wrong’)
underpinned by value monism. This precise point of value monism is what we
have targeted through our method of operationalizing value complexity in
order to raise integrative complexity as a form of prevention in Kenya.
The above argument is in line with a comprehensive review commissioned by
the United Kingdom (UK) government into prevention initiatives.14 The
report asserts that initiatives work best when they support open questioning
in a peer group context and are focused on the harder skills such as critical
thinking, appreciating different perspectives, developing a person’s own
worldview, learning to work well with others and appreciating tensions
between different viewpoints. These enable people to critically examine
extremist discourse. Long lasting benefits come through building resilience
through affirming complex social identities and developing conflict
management skills. These goals cohere with the value complexity approach to
prevention discussed here.
8

Jose Liht and Sara Savage. “Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity: Being
Muslim Being British,” Journal of Strategic Security 6:4 (2013): 44-66.
9 Funded by USAID, organized by the Kenya Transition Initiative.
10 Berlin, Isaiah, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (London: John Murray, 1990).
11 Conway, Luke and K.R. Conway, The terrorist rhetorical style and its consequences for
understanding terrorist violence: Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict (London: Routledge,
2011); Suedfeld, Peter, Legkaia, K. and Brcic, J. "Changes in the hierarchy of value references
associated with flying in space," Journal of Personality 78:5 (2010).
12 Gambetta, Diego and Steffan Hertog, Engineers of Jihad (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2007).
13 J. Ginges et al., "Psychology out of the Laboratory: The Challenge of Violent Extremism,"
American Psychologist 66 (2011).
14 Department of Education, UK, “Teaching Approaches that Help Build Resilience Among
Young People”, OPM and National Research Foundation, 2010. available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/182675/D
FE-RR119.pdf
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Developing the Being Kenyan Being Muslim (BKBM) Intervention
BKBM aims to remove the obstacles to participants’ normal cognitive
development as it progresses from simplicity to complexity. A vast literature
supports that complex information processing, undergirded by the attempt to
maximize multiple competing values, is associated with non-violent strategies
for conflict resolution.15 A large body of cross-cultural research by Peter
Suedfeld and colleagues shows that conflict is predicted when integrative
complexity (IC, from henceforth) drops from its recent baseline (measured in
the communication of political decision-makers); conversely when IC rises,
peaceful solutions to conflict ensue.16 Because individuals are more receptive
to messages with a complexity level similar to their own when thinking about
conflicted social issues, increasing complexity builds resilience to the low
complexity communications and recruitment efforts of extremists.17
The pilot BKBM version (based on the structure of Being Muslim Being
British) is a sixteen-contact-hour, multi-media course for people ages 16+
who are exposed to extremist discourse, as well as to train professionals who
are seeking to counter extremism. BKBM was adapted to include relevant
aspects of Kenyan culture, the impact of global terrorism on Kenyan society,
and the consequences of the events of the Westgate terrorist attacks in
Nairobi in 2013, followed by reprisals on the Somali community in Eastleigh,
Nairobi, Mombasa and other areas of Kenya where there is a high Somali
population. The intervention uses DVD films to represent an array of Muslim
viewpoints from the extreme right to the extreme left including middle
positions followed by group activities inspired by Theatre of the Oppressed
pedagogy that help participants become aware of the value trade-offs in each
position.18 The original BMBB course materials were augmented with images
and music from Kenyan society and popular culture, making the effects of
poverty, politics, corruption and the development of the middle class within
Kenya society explicit in the activities, as efforts to re-create the cultural
milieu in which the social nature of thinking proceeds.19
We piloted BKBM in Eastleigh, Nairobi, Kenya in January 2014. Over four
intense days, the schedule in Kenya comprised:
Day 1. Pre-testing; Session (1) Life in Kenya; Session (2) Relationships
and values.
Day 2. Session (3) Equality; Session (4) Justice and money.
Day 3. Session (5) Science and religion; Session (6) Peace or fitna.
15

P.E. Tetlock, Armor and Peterson, "The slavery debate in antebellum America: Cognitive
style, value conflict, and the limits of compromise"; Carmit T. Tadmor, Philip E. Tetlock, and
Kaiping Peng, "Biculturalism and integrative complexity: Testing the acculturation complexity
model" (paper presented at the Academy of Management Proceedings, 2006/08).
16 Peter Suedfeld, D.C. Leighton and Luke Conway, “Integrative Complexity and Cognitive
Management in International Confrontations: Research and Potential Applications,” in M.
Fitzduff & C.E. Stout, (eds.), The Psychology of War, Conflict Resolution, and Peace (New
York: Praeger, 2005); Peter Suedfeld, K. Legkaia and J. Brcic, "Changes in the Hierarchy of
Value References Associated with Flying in Space," Journal of Personality 78:5 (2010).
17 Peter Suedfeld and Alistair B. Wallbaum, "Modifying Integrative Complexity in Political
Thought: Value Conflict and Audience Disagreement," Revista Interamericana de Psicologia
26:1 (1992).
18 Boal, Augusto, Legislative Theatre: Using Performance to Make Politics (London: Routledge,
1998).
19 Vygostky, Luria S., Mind in Society: the Development of Higher Psychological Processes,
Michael Cole, Vera John-Steiner, Sylvia Scribner, Ellen Souberman (eds.) (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press 1978).
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Day 4. Session (7) Purity and Pleasure; Session (8) with participant
presentations, and post-testing.

BKBM’s three steps of transformation
Transformation Step 1: Differentiation
Like Being Muslim Being British, the explicit aim of BKBM is to increase
thinking complexity promoted by value pluralism, measured by IC.20 The first
aspect of IC is differentiation, the ability to perceive multiple viewpoints or
dimensions on an issue.21 Eight topics used by radicalizers to increase
cleavage between Muslim and Western-influenced worldviews and identities
were selected, and each topic was presented from the differing perspectives of
three to four well-known Muslim speakers via filmed interviews (on DVD) to
promote differentiation. For example, in session 1, to address the topic “How
should young Muslims should live in Kenya?” four influential speakers
present their different viewpoints arguing for 1) an international Caliphate, 2)
separatist (Salafist) personal piety, 3) integrating into society while
maintaining Muslim identity and faith, and 4) support for jihadism. Through
this, participants are motivated to make some sense of the variety of Muslim
viewpoints, with group discussions relevant to tensions between Kenyans and
ethnic Somalians, and are spurred to think afresh about the topic.
Transformation Step 2: Value Pluralism
Step 2 involves enabling participants to discover some validity in the values
that undergird each of the four viewpoints, even the extreme ones, but
without having to sacrifice other competing values—which is implicit in
adopting every aspect of extreme viewpoints. This second step of enabling
value pluralism is operationalized through a dilemma structure for the
session, and in which participants can find reasons to maximise a wider array
of their own values in their moral reasoning. We draw on Philip Tetlock’s
Value Pluralism model22 that argues that a motivating force for doing the
extra cognitive work of integratively complex thinking comes from the desire
to maximise more than one value when those values are in tension with each
other and each has high importance in participants’ personal hierarchies.
While extremist ideologies concentrate, for example, on the magnetic pull of
one value, such as ‘justice for the community’, to the exclusion of ‘individual
liberty’, BKBM enables people to explore the importance of both ends of
various value spectrums.
After positioning the four film speakers along the value spectrums,
participants are next invited to ‘vote with their feet’ to show where they
personally position themselves on that value spectrum, and to explore the
pushes and pulls they experience in their lives in Kenya. Participants are
encouraged to think about both value poles in a way consonant with their own
value priorities and real life constraints, rather than remaining ‘stuck’ in the
value monism of radical discourse. In this way, cultural differences, for
example, between Kenyan and Somali cultures, between aspirations for
20

Peter Suedfeld, K. Legkaia and J. Brcic, "Changes in the hierarchy of value references
associated with flying in space."
21 Suedfeld, Peter, Philip E. Tetlock and Siegfried Streufert, "Conceptual/Integrative
Complexity" in Motivation and Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis, editors
C.P. Smith, et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
22 Philip E. Tetlock, "A Value Pluralism Model of Ideological Reasoning," Journal of
Personality & Social Psychology 50:4 (1986); Tetlock, Armor and Peterson, "The slavery
debate in antebellum America: Cognitive style, value conflict, and the limits of compromise."
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individual achievement versus loyalty to communitarian, traditional values,
become easier to understand, and thus bridge, from a vantage point of value
pluralism. This is done in the context of non-judgemental discussion of all
the possible positions on the values continuum and the tensions between
them.23 Through these group-learning activities, the black and white
categorizations resulting from increased cleavage between social groups begin
to dissolve.
Transformation Step 3: Integration
Integratively complex thinking requires the ability to find some linkages
between the different viewpoints, or to perceive an overarching framework
that makes sense of why reasonable people can maintain differing views.24
Value-complex solutions protect both sacred and secular values of different
groups, and this in turn enables peaceful and stable resolutions for intergroup conflict (of which violent extremisms are a particular type) in the
context of globalization.
For example, a group activity to foster integration (the discovery of linkages
or frameworks to make sense of different viewpoints) centers around a
conflict of interests between two polarized ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ groups, role-played
by participants taking either the role of wealthy suburban home owners living
in Nairobi suburb, or the role of refugee dwellers in a shanty town close to the
town’s borders. Participants experience how the conflict (physically,
emotionally and cognitively) intensifies and polarizes perceptions of the
ingroup and outgroup in the role play. As both groups’ demands calcify, they
slide into creating an over-simplified ideology, which intensifies the intergroup conflict as people rally to their group’s slogans and group leader. Role
playing enables participants to ‘see’ the polarization between groups
intensifying in the room. ‘Mediators’ (role played by participants) are brought
into the scene, and by focussing on the underlying human values of both
groups’ demands, some value commonalities are discovered, as well as
recognizing that some differences will continue to remain. Negotiation
becomes possible, though not easy, once some common values are recognized
in both groups. Thus, the practical side of problem solving can begin.
Building on experiential, embodied group learning such as this, participants
reflect upon the various tensions, for example, between economic and
political principles that promote the interests of the rich, in comparison with
those that promote the interests of the poor, freed from value monism and the
social pressure arising from extremist discourse that presents any Western
economic principles and Islamic finance as completely alien to each other.
The black and white communications of radicalizers come to appear less
convincing, as trade-offs that respect participants’ own values are deemed
possible, and are affirmed in a relevant peer group context.
These activities enable a further set of IC-related skills: meta-cognition, social
intelligence and embodied cognition. Meta-cognition is supported by Theatre
of the Oppressed pedagogy as physically enacted role-play enables
participants to ‘see’ themselves, their reactions and perceptions of others, and
to reflect on that through group discussion. For example, a role-play where a
‘stranger’ walks into the zone of an already established social group enabled
participants to perceive the pervasive ingroup/outgroup dynamics between
23Tetlock,
24

Armor Peterson, “The slavery debate…”
Suedfeld, Tetlock and Streufert, "Conceptual/Integrative Complexity."
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Kenyans and Somalis. Social intelligence skills are supported through
empathy-fostering activities such as ‘active listening’ practiced through role
play in trios of participants trying to reconcile a conflict that was once
experienced by one of the trio members. Mixed groups of participants, as in
this sample, where both sides of the countering violent extremism (CVE)
divide are involved in the role plays promotes the capacity to perceive
differing perspectives. Experiencing cognition as embodied and multisensory is encouraged through group activities involving movement and
mime, and through the multi-sensory DVD input (music, symbols, images,
and film clips) resourcing a broader focus of attention, assuaging the
defensive ‘tunnel vision’ of rigid thinking that can arise from concentrating on
words and conceptual systems only.25 The educational process works with the
dilemma structure in each session, using physical and interpersonal
enactment through role plays, leading to a more complex narrative
understanding of CVE related issues, with participants reflecting analytically
upon their experiences through discussion. Together these comprise the steps
to complex critical thinking which in turn enables people to ‘see through’ the
strategies of radicalizers.

Effectiveness Evaluation
We assessed the effectiveness of the eight session course through testing one
main hypothesis and one exploratory hypothesis:
As a result of the intervention, participants will think in more
complex ways about social issues underpinned by conflicting values
by showing an increase in the levels if IC (IC) when comparing verbal
data gathered just before and after the course.
The hypothesis was tested on two sets of verbal data: (Comparison 1) through
the IC coding of written responses to Paragraph Completion Tests before and
after the course, and (Comparison 2) through the qualitative analysis
examining the presence of the two steps of IC (differentiation and integration)
as applied by participants in the transcribed presentations each participant
gave at the end of the course.
1. An exploratory hypothesis to examine whether participants’ conflict
styles change in the Post test (according to a Conflict Styles
Questionnaire).26
Figure 1: Pre and post-test comparisons
Pre test Post test Participant Presentations
H1: Increase in IC
Comparison 1
Comparison 2
H2: Change in conflict styles Comparison 3

Method
Sample and Recruitment
25 Sara Savage, “Head and Heart in Preventing Religious Radicalization,” in F. Watts and G.
Dumbreck (eds.), Head and Heart: Perspectives from Religion and Psychology (West
Conshohoken, PA: Templeton Press, 2013).
26 Eolene Boyd-MacMillan, “Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire,” in Eolene Boyd-MacMillan and
Sara Savage, Report on I SEE! Life Skills for a Changing Scotland, Empirical Effectiveness
Report for the Scottish Government (2013).
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Twenty-four participants participated, with twenty-two completing all aspects
of the Pre and Post testing assessment. Questionnaire data revealed a mean
age of 29.6 (SD=6.27) years. Sex of participants was 12 (52 percent) males and
11 (48 percent) females (one missing). Of 24 participants, 23 (96 percent)
were born in Kenya; one (4 percent) was born in Somalia, 18 (92 percent) had
secondary education, 12 (50 percent) had technical college education (mean
1.7 years), 9 (37 percent) had university education (mean 3.6 years), and 12
(50 percent) had Islamic religious education (mean 6.5 years). Eighteen (75
percent) participants reported being in work; 7 (29 percent) reported being
unemployed/looking for new work.
Participants’ group/community of identification, or ingroup (the term used
henceforth to indicate participants’ group/community with which they
reported they strongly identified) were:
•

•
•
•
•
•

‘Muslim’ (5 participants), ‘Kenyan Muslim’ (4),‘Sunni Muslim’
(1)‘Muslim Sunni in Africa’(1),‘Muslim/Christian’ (1), ‘Muslim 1st &
my neighbour’ (1)
‘Christian’ (3),‘Christian/Muslim’ (1)
‘Kenyan’ (3)
‘Somali’ (2)
‘Kamba’ (1)
‘People I live with in peace’(1).

Of the twenty-three participants, 14 (61 percent) report firstly a Muslim
identity.
Participants’ self-designated outgroup (‘the group/community most
different/opposed to my group’) are listed below:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Somalis (4), Somali & my own tribe (1)
Islam (1), Shias (2), Muslim/Christian/Islam (1),
Non-Somalis (1)
Christians (2), White Christians (1),
Western influenced (1), Secular (1), Secular & tribal (1)
My tribe (2), Kikuyu (1), Luo tribe (1),
Infidels & gangs (1), Terrorists (1), Al Shabaab (1), Radical Muslim
youth (1), the inhumane (1)
Arab (1), Arabs & rich people (1), Hindu & rich people (1),
Dishonest/fake (1), Non-coastal (1), African Rastafarians (1)
None/ I like everyone (2)

Based on information from Kenya Transition Initiative staff, the participants
are assigned to subgroups for statistical analysis:
Subgroup 1 = Recent members of al Shabaab (n = 6)
Subgroup 2 = KTI staff (n = 4)
Subgroup 3 = Beneficiaries and grantees of KTI work (agencies and
co-workers) (n = 10)
Subgroup 4 = Moderately vulnerable individuals but not linked with al
Shabaab (n = 2) .
Of particular interest are the demographic characteristics of Subgroup 1
comprising recent al Shabaab members. Their profile is similar to the other
7
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groups in terms of higher education (out of six, two attended technical college,
one attended university) and regarding employment (four are in work
involving sign writing, ‘mobilizer’, business and community work), with two
participants unemployed/looking for work. Demographics that are distinctive
for Subgroup 1 in comparison to the overall sample group concern gender
balance (four males, two females), age (a higher mean age of 32), lower
secondary education (four out of the six report having no secondary education
(high school) whereas the rest of the sample have four years secondary and
beyond), as well as fewer years in Islamic religious education (mean 4.8 years
compared to 6.5 years). Subgroup 1 also showed slightly higher scores on the
Social Identity & Power (SIP) Scale (mean = 20.3) compared to Subgroups 2
and 3 (mean = 17.15). The SIP Scale consists of five items concerning
perceived power relations between participant’s designated ingroup and
outgroup.27 Higher mean scores indicate that the participant agrees or
strongly agrees with statements that their ingroup is treated unfairly by a
more powerful outgroup that does not allow ingroup upward mobility, and
whose position of power is now possible to overturn—a set of social
perceptions that maps onto the structure of radical narratives.28 Subgroup 4
(moderately vulnerable participants, n =2) shows a similar pattern to
Subgroup 1 with relatively higher SIP scores (mean = 20.0) and fewer years in
Islamic education (mean = 1 year) in comparison to the wider sample.

Sampling procedure
We were invited by the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI), funded by United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), to trial BKBM in
Kenya. Participants known through KTI’s intensive fieldwork in the
Eastleigh, Nairobi area were selected based upon recent activity or alignment
with extremist groups or ideology, and were invited by KTI to participate in
the pilot BKBM course. Subgroups 1 and 4 comprise the vulnerable-toextremism participants with whom KTI has been working, and Subgroup 3
comprise co-workers in the field, organizations and individuals to whom KTI
subcontract. Subgroup 2 comprise KTI staff. A balanced spread such as this,
comprising targeted individuals and intervention providers in a single IC
course, helps to engender perspective taking on both sides of the extremism
divide, and brings alive the tensions relating to extremism, contributing to
learning outcomes. The BKBM course was facilitated by an experienced
Being Muslim Being British facilitator who was born and raised in Kenya.
Instruments/measures
Paragraph Completion Tests. Two open ended paragraphs were presented
during the Pre test and the Post test to elicit verbal data for IC coding. To
elicit this data, participants were first asked to write down answers to items A
and B:

Jose Liht and Sara Savage, “Being Muslim Being
British: A Multi-media Educational Resource for
Young Muslims” in G. Joffe (ed) Radicalisation (IB
Tauris, 2011).
31

28 Sara Savage and Jose Liht, “Radical Religious Speech: How to Assemble the Ingredients of a
Binary world view.” in J. Weinstein (ed), Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008).
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(A) The community (group) that I indentify strongly with
is_______________
(Examples: Kenyan... Muslim… Somali… Sufi… Islamic… African… my
tribe … African Muslim… Secular… Salafi…Arab… Western influenced
…White… Christian… Other… Use any combination)
(B) The community (group) that is most unlike/ opposed to my group
is_________________
Next, the facilitator led the participants in a ‘Think Aloud’ group warm-up
exercise using two topics unrelated to extremism (preferred colours and
foods) to encourage people to express their thinking freely and fully when
writing out their responses. ‘Think Aloud’ technique is standard practice
when researchers are more interested in process of thinking, the ‘how’ of
thinking, rather than in the content of thinking.29
Next, participants were asked to write as much as they can in the blank space
provided to answer two open-ended questions:
1. When I think about MY community (group) …
2. When I think about the OTHER group …
Paragraph Completion Tests (PCTs) have established validity in eliciting
responses that have an argument or evaluation structure and that can be
coded for IC.30
Participant presentations. Recordings (video and audio, with participant
permission) were taken throughout, including all participant presentations
given at the end of the last session. Recordings were transcribed verbatim
and labelled with the participant’s code.
Transcripts of participant presentations were coded qualitatively for evidence
of learning concerning the two steps of IC (differentiation and integration),
and for evidence of confidence to address extremist issues with IC skills, and
for increases in social intelligence (such as empathy for the ‘other’).
Integrative complexity (IC). All IC coding for the Paragraph Completion Tests
followed the standardized IC coding frame and protocol.31 Inter-coder
reliability criteria was assessed by calculating Kappa levels between two
trained coders blind to the pre-intervention post-intervention conditions.
Demographics and Social Identity & Power measures. A short five-item
demographics questionnaire was given at the end of the course, and the fiveitem Social Identity & Power (SIP) Scale (concerning perceived power
relations relative to the participant’s ingroup and outgroup), was given during
both Pre and Post testing. (See Appendix.)

29 Erickson, K. A. and H.A. Simon, Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1984).
30 E. H. Bottenberg, “Instrumental Characteristics and Validity of the Paragraph Completion
Test (PCT) as a Measure of Integrative Complexity,” Psychological Reports 24 (1969): 437-38.
31 Gloria Baker-Brown, E.J. Ballard, S. Bluck, B. Vries de, P. Suedfeld and P.E. Tetlock, “The
Conceptual/Integrative Complexity Scoring Manual,” in C.P. Smith (ed.), Motivation and
Personality: Handbook of Thematic Content Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992).
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Conflict styles questionnaire. A conflict styles questionnaire with two
scenarios for the Pre test, and two different scenarios for the Post test (see
Appendix) was adapted to create Kenyan scenarios, and was used to assess
pre-post changes in conflict style. Each scenario was followed by five
response options that captured Kraybill’s five empirically derived conflict
style constructs.32 Kraybill’s five conflict style constructs differ on how much
the issue in comparison to the persons/ relationships involved in the conflict
are deemed important:
1. Direct. The issue is deemed so important that a direct style of
communication is used to address the conflict, if needed, at the
expense of the relationship.
2. Avoid. Neither the issue nor the relationships are deemed
important, so avoiding the conflict is chosen.
3. Accommodate. Preserving the relationship is deemed more
important than the issue, so giving in to the other party is chosen in
order to resolve the conflict.
4. Compromise. Both the issue and relationships are deemed
somewhat important. Giving away something in order to gain
something is deemed the best way to resolve the conflict.
5. Collaborate. Creative ways to maximise both the high importance
of values and the high importance of relationships are found to resolve
the conflict.
Procedure
Eight two-hour BKBM sessions were completed over a period of four days, led
by a trained course facilitator with the aid of a BKBM facilitator’s manual. The
venue for the course was a hotel conference suite in Nairobi, with breaks
allocated for lunch, tea and prayers. Attendance records show full attendance
across the four days for the twenty-two participants who completed the Pre
and Post testing.

Results
Intercoder Reliability
In order to verify the reliability of IC scores across pre and post conditions,
one researcher coded all the paragraphs from the Paragraph Completion Tests
(4 x 22 = 88), blind to pre-post conditions. In accordance with accepted
practice, a secondary scorer blind to the pre-post conditions, coded eight
paragraphs (around 10 percent of a stratified random subsample,
representing relevant subgroups and spread of IC).33
Cohen’s Kappa index of reliability (which measures for exact correspondence,
not just correlation) was calculated for the IC scores of the Paragraph
Completion Tests. The result, Kappa = 0.89, indicated a very good intercoder
reliability levels (93.3 percent agreement, SD= 0.20, Z = 4.43, p > 0.00001).

32

Eolene Boyd-MacMillan, “Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire,” in Eolene Boyd-MacMillan and
Sara Savage, Report on I SEE! Life Skills for a Changing Scotland, Empirical Effectiveness
Report for the Scottish Government; Ronald S. Kraybill and Evelyn Wright, The Little Book of
Cool Tools for Hot Topics: Group Tools to Facilitate Meetings When Things Are Hot
(Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2006).
33 Baker-Brown, Ballard, Bluck, de Vries, Suedfeld, Tetlock, “The Conceptual/Integrative
Complexity Scoring Manual.”
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Comparison 1. Hypothesis 1: IC in Written Responses to Paragraph
Completion Tests
In order to test whether BKBM was effective in increasing the complexity with
which participants think about conflicted social issues relevant to extremism,
we coded the Paragraph Completion Tests (PCTs) for all twenty-two
participants according to IC coding practice (measuring the underlying
structure of thinking) and compared scores for participants’ paragraphs at the
beginning of Session 1 (Pre test) and at the end of Session 8 (Post test). All
coding was performed under blind-to-group and condition, by two trained IC
coders.
A paired samples t-test was carried out. Mean IC level for the pre-test was
1.32 (SD=0.29), the post-test was 1.95 (SD=0.53) and the mean gain in IC was
0.63 (SD=0.45). See Chart 1.
The statistical t-test of difference between pre-test and post-test (related
samples) for IC (M=-0.625, SD=0.45, n = 22, t (19) = -6.140, p >0.0001)
provided evidence for an increase in IC levels.
Chart 1: Comparisons of Mean IC Scores in Pre and Post Test

IC Comparisons for Ingroup and Outgroup
Mean IC level for the Pre-test participants’ designated ingroup (the
‘group/community with which I strongly identify’) was 1.43 (SD=0.57), the
post-test was 2.29 (SD=0.72) and the mean gain in IC was 0.86 (SD=0.45).
The statistical t-test of difference between pre-test and post-test (paired
samples) for IC was t (20) = -5.403, p <0.0001) provided evidence for an
increase in IC levels in regard to participants’ ingroup.
Mean IC level for the post-test outgroup (the ‘group/community
different/opposed to my group’) was 1.19 (SD=0.41), the post-test was 1.57
(SD=0.81) and the mean gain in IC was 0.38 (SD=0.45). The statistical t-test
of difference between pre-test and post-test (paired samples) for IC was t (20)
= -2.169, p <0.042) provided evidence for an increase in IC levels in regards
to participants’ outgroup.
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Thus, IC gains were strongest concerning participants’ self-designated
designated
ingroup, although both ingroup and outgroup
o
IC gains are significant. All four
subgroups showed a similar trend of higher IC gains for the ingroup
ngroup.
Subgroups
ubgroups showed
show differences in overall IC gains. Subgroup 2 (KTI
The four subgroups
staff) showed the highest IC means in both Pre and Post tests. Subgroup 1
(former al Shabaab
abaab members) showed the lowest
lowes IC means in both Pre and
Post test, with the smallest magnitude of change. See Chart 2. However, all
groups showed IC gain, and there were no between groups differences
according to a Oneway analysis of variance, F (22)=1.086, p=0.167..
Chart 2: IC Pre
re and Post Test Gains by Subgroups

Hypothesis 1 was supported overall. Results indicate that the intervention
had an effect of increasing the complexity with which participants think about
social issues and social groups relevant to extremism as indicated by levels of
IC.
Comparison 2. Hypothesis 2:
2 Evidence of Application of IC in
Participants’ Presentations
resentations
At thee end of the final session, participants
participant gave a presentation to the group.
group
The facilitator had instructed participants in Session 5 that they will be asked
to give a presentation at the end of Session 8 to share what they have learned
through the course, and how they are applying, or wish to apply IC (or not) to
specific situations relevant to their life. All twenty-two participants
rticipants gave a
presentation. These were tape recorded (yielding
(yiel
1.5 hours of tape)
ape) and
transcribed verbatim. The transcripts were qualitatively analyzed for
f the
presence of learning about and applying step 1 of IC, differentiation
iation (the
(
ability to perceive the validity of two or more dimensions, viewpoints or
outcomes to temporal sequences)
se
and step 2 of IC, integration (the
the ability to
perceive underlying common values, linkages between, or overarching
frameworks, that make sense of the differentiated array).
array Each ‘chunk’ of
verbal data that fulfilled either of these criteria was given a score of 1, and
these were summed for a final cumulative Participant Presentation Score.
S
This is a qualitative measure of participants internalizing and applying IC
constructs;; it is not a coding of the structure of argumentation.
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Participant Presentation Scores were correlated with the participants’ Post
test mean IC scores (paired samples). The Presentation Scores correlated
significantly with participants’ Post test mean IC scores (Spearman’s rho (21)
= 0.81, p <0.01, two tailed).
Qualitative analysis revealed evidences of understanding and applying
differentiation in 100 percent (22 of 22) participant presentations. Evidence
of understanding and applying integration were present in 50 percent (11 of
22) of participant presentations. Qualitative analysis showed that
participants experienced an increase in social intelligence as a result of the
course (for example, gaining insight into own and other people’s views and
experiences, particularly for those who are different, empathy for others, and
new emotional control) were evident in 77 percent (17 of 22) of participant
presentations. Evidence of confidence gained from applying the skills and
principles of IC to conflicts relevant to extremism and in everyday life were
evident in 100 percent of the presentations.
Comparison 3. Conflict Styles Questionnaire
As increased value complexity and thinking complexity (IC) promotes
resolution of conflict34, we explored whether conflict styles changed as a result
of the course. Five conflict styles are empirically discriminated by Kraybill:
Direct, Accommodate, Avoid, Compromise and Collaborate.35 Results show
that the Direct conflict style significantly increases and that Avoid,
Compromise and Collaborate significantly decreased in the Post test. The
Post test change in the Direct conflict style is of the greatest magnitude. See
Table 1.
Table 1. Conflict Styles Pre and Post Test
Pre
SD
Post
mean
mean
Avoid
6.29
1.51
4.33
Direct
4.32
2.15
8.81
Accommodate 6.91
2.51
8.13
Compromise
6.09
1.94
4.17
Collaborate
7.52
1.38
4.86

SD
2.01
1.81
2.03
2.79
1.63

t
statistic
4.254
-9.160
-1.719
2.244
6.388

df

p

23
21
22
22
22

.000
.000
Non sig
0.035
0.000

Correlations with SIP Scale and Demographics Questionnaire - Post Hoc
Analysis
We explored the relationship of demographic characteristics and SIP Scale
factors with IC and conflict styles (there was no difference between SIP scores
Pre test compared with Post test, and this holds across all four Subgroups).
Years in Islamic religious education correlate negatively with IC regarding the
ingroup, but positively (and significantly) for the outgroup in the Post
condition (Pearsons r (20)=0.627, p=0.039. See Table 2, below.
Of interest are two trends: years in Technical College correlates negatively
with IC, but years in University correlates positively with IC, particularly
towards the ingroup; these are moderate but non-significant correlations. See
Table 2.
34

Suedfeld, Leighton and Conway, “Integrative Complexity and Cognitive Management…”
Kraybill, Ronald S. and Wright, Evelyn, The little book of cool tools for hot topics : group
tools to facilitate meetings when things are hot (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2006).
35
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Table 2. Parametric Correlations Between Education and IC Scores
Pre test
Post test
Ingroup
Outgroup
Ingroup
Outgroup
Years in
Islamic
-.125
.276
-.161
.627
education
Significance
ns
ns
ns
p=0.039
Years in
Technical
-.324
-.212
-.039
-.324
College
Significance
ns
ns
ns
ns
Years in
.429
.364
.424
.335
University
Significance
ns
ns
ns
ns
The five-item SIP Scale, as explained earlier, measures perceptions of power
relations concerning participants’ self-identified ingroup and outgroup. High
scores on the SIP Scale indicate perceptions of one’s ingroup as unfairly
treated by a more powerful outgroup that does not allow for ingroup upward
mobility, and whose powerful position is likely to be overturned. SIP scores
were slightly higher for Subgroups 1 and 4 (ex-al Shabaab and moderately
vulnerable participants, respectively) in comparison with the wider sample.
The Post test SIP scale correlated negatively with IC scores for the outgroup in
the Post test (Pearsons r (20)= -.506, p <0.027 two tailed).
Age correlated negatively with IC scores in the Pre test concerning
participants’ ingroup, (Pearsons r (20)= -0.477, p = 0.029, two tailed).
Correlations with conflict styles
Years in Islamic religious education correlated negatively with the Direct
conflict style in the Pre test (Pearsons r (20)= -.665, p <0.025, two tailed). In
the Post test, the negative correlation is lower, and not significant (-.117, ns).
This pattern of negative correlation was evident across all four Subgroups.
The Avoid conflict style Post test correlates negatively with mean IC in the
Post test (Pearsons r (20) = -0.439, p = 0.041, two tailed). There were no
other significant correlations between conflict styles and IC.

Discussion
The BKBM course results shows overall significant gains in IC in written
responses to Paragraph Completion tests, from a mean IC score of 1.3 in the
Pre test to a score of 1.9 in the Post test. An IC score of 1 (from a scale of 1 to
7) indicates the lowest level of integrative: viewing, for example, social groups
categorically (all good or all bad), dichotomising the social world into ‘us
versus then’, judging the domain in question from a single evaluative
viewpoint, rejecting other viewpoints or dimensions (‘only my viewpoint is
correct’), reducing ambiguity (no shades of grey, no mixture), with causation
simply conceived as, for example, ‘x causes y’.
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As the complexity of extremist discourse decreases as commitment to violence
increases, the very low IC level of AQ discourse inevitably precludes any other
means to resolve conflict other than mobilisation to their cause.36 As this
constructed moral obligation to engage in violent conflict comes to be seen as
unecessary through the IC intervention, more productive means to resolve
conflict become possible. New ways of resolving conflict are experienced
within the course and validated within a relevant peer group.
An IC score of 2 (rounding up from 1.9) signifies emerging or conditional
acceptance of other dimensions or viewpoints regarding the issue at hand,
though this is not extensively developed. At an IC score of 2, rather than
seeing the social world categorically and dichotomously, now multiple
dimensions to an issue and exceptions to the rule are being acknowledged.
Shades of grey, rather than black or white choices, are conditionally accepted,
there is an increased tolerance for ambiguity, and an acceptance that others
may hold different viewpoints from one’s one. However, this is a transitional
stage given that argumentation is not extensively elaborated. In this study,
this significant increase to an IC score of 2, while not large numerically, is a
meaningful change in regards to the diminishment of violent conflict: other
ways of construing the social world are now made possible, the categorical,
black and white structure of the extremist worldview is dissolving.
It is acknowledged that there are floor effects to measuring IC. It is quite hard
to capture enough argumentation or evaluation in verbal data for IC to be
scorable, and this is particularly hard under written ‘test conditions’ such as
the written Pre and Post testing here. The advantage of measuring IC is that,
as well as being predictive of the outcomes of conflict, the structure of
thinking is relatively unfakable. When people think, their attention is focused
on the content of their thinking, not its underlying structure. Thus, to capture
a significant change in the structure of thinking represents data that is
virtually unfakable on the part of participants, especially under test conditions
where pre-planning is not possible. Whereas it is acknowledged that speakers
can apply some ‘impression management’ in their verbalizations, for example,
using lower IC when speaking to children, it would be very hard to fake a rise
in IC concerning issues one feels strongly about.
In line with theories of individual cognitive development, and that of and
early humans, change in the structure of argument (measured by IC)
leveraged in the BKBM intervention represents the last stage of a series of
deeper changes that firstly involve embodied enactment, then interpersonal,
episodic learning, thirdly linking those earlier stages into a narrative, and
finally reflecting upon that conceptually.37 Thus, we argue that the changes
that are visible through IC coding are in fact the tip of a deeper ‘iceberg’. We
are pleased that we were able to capture significant IC gain, given the known
floor effects of IC and the challenge of eliciting verbal data showing argument
or evaluation under test conditions. We also think that the simple, openended Paragraph Completion Test items were a better way to elicit IC codable
data in comparison with the detailed moral dilemmas (with their greater

36 Suedfeld, Cross, and Logan, “Can Thematic Analysis Separate the Pyramid of Ideas from the
Pyramid of Actions?”.
37 Jerome Bruner, “The Narrative Construction of Reality,” Critical Inquiry 18:1(1991): 1-21;
Vygostsky, Luria S., Mind in Society; Bellah, Robert, Religion in Human Evolution: From the
Paleolithic to the Axial Age, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
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cognitive load) that we had used in the first assessment of Being Muslim
Being British.38
Gains in IC are significant for participants’ self-designated ingroup and
outgroup, but are of greater magnitude for the ingroup. This may reflect that
fact that information about one’s own ingroup is more readily available to
thinkers.39 It also mirrors the process of de-radicalization described in
autobiographical accounts of those who have exited extremist groups.40 In
these accounts, extremists de-covert from their former radical cause often
through a growing awareness of the flaws and contradictions of the extremist
ingroup, particularly the ingroup leaders. The growing perception that the
extremist ingroup comprises variously motivated individuals who are mixture
of both good and bad is a crucial step towards being able to critically analyse
the ingroup’s mission and methods. BKBM helps to bring about this
awareness indirectly, as a direct frontal attack against a participant’s ingroup
and its ideology is likely to elicit defensiveness. Instead, our approach is to
leverage the skills of complex thinking across a range of issues (some directly
concerning extremism, others concern underlying issues, such as family
relationships, gender equality and sex) and through increasing participants’
recognition of their own spread of values.
A low complexity paragraph about a participants’ ingroup is seen in this Pretest paragraph:
“al Shabaab – the most important obligation for Muslims is to make
kufirs suffer for what they have inflicted on Muslims living in that.”
(IC score 1, former al Shabaab member, Pre test)
A higher complexity paragraph about another participants’ ingroup is seen in
this Post-test paragraph:
“I feel my group [Christians] deliberately misleads its members about
what Muslims believe in. I feel there is a subtle hatred in a way. There
is a feeling that their belief is not grounded in history and that is not
true. There is a misunderstanding about what Muslims believe in
simply because Christians do not know a lot about Muslims. I feel that
some people (Christians) can not tell the difference between Somalis,
Arabs and Muslims, and that makes it hard for them to differentiate
between cultures and religion. I also wish this community should
learn to be more accomodating as they have more power and the more
extreme they get in thought, the more it is bad for reconciliation and
finding a true understanding between Muslims and Christians.” (IC
score 4, showing multiple dimensions and causality understood as
implicitly involving mutual influence, Subgroup 3 participant, Post
test).
We expected that the four Subgroups would show differences in IC gains, and
this was the case. Nevertheless, there were no significant between-groups
differences. The most professionally resourced group, Subgroup 2, (KTI
38

Jose Liht and Sara Savage, “Preventing Violent Extremism through Value Complexity.”
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C., “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict,” The Social
Psychology of Intergroup Relations (1979): 33-47.
40 Husein, Ed, The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why
I Left (Penguin 2007); Nawaz, Maajid, Radical: My Journey from Extremist Islamism to a
Democratic Awakening (London: WH Allen, 2013).
39

16
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss3/2
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.3.1

Savage et al.: Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya through Value Complexity

staff), showed the highest mean IC in the Pre test, and the highest mean in the
Post test. Subgroup 1 (former al Shabaab members) showed the lowest IC in
the Pre test and Post test. Two factors seem relevant here: Subgroup 1 had
four (of six) participants with no secondary (high school) education as well as
less Islamic religious education, compared to the wider group. They also
showed higher SIP scores, indicative of the influence of extremist narrative.
These factors make it likely that Subgroup 1 faced a longer and harder journey
in emerging from very low IC, although progress was made.
It is interesting that years in Islamic religious education correlates negatively
with IC regarding the Pre test, but correlates positively (and significantly) for
the outgroup in the Post test. The correlation between Islamic education and
IC is the only correlation that shows significant reversal, comparing Pre to
Post conditions. It seems that IC, as a result of the intervention, is acting as a
moderator on the variable ‘years in Islamic religious education’, at least in
regard to perceptions of the outgroup in the Post test. If this interpretation is
correct, IC seems to ‘turbo charge’ traditional Islamic teaching regarding
mercy and benevolence to the ‘other’ in the Post test. Years in university
correlates moderately with IC gain (but not significantly so) towards the
ingroup (only), whereas years in technical college correlates negatively with
IC (also not significantly) in both Pre and Post tests, in line with research
showing that those well trained to solve problems having a concrete ‘right
answer’ (such as engineering problems) are over-represented among violent
extremists.41
The negative correlation between SIP scores and IC provides a snapshot of the
essence of the problem that all counter-extremism efforts face: those more
deeply committed to an extremist narrative have a longer journey to emerge
from it, and this is particularly so if the nature and length of education fails to
resource the normal developmental pathway from simplicity to complexity.
The results of this BKBM course show encouraging but realistic results in this
regard: the IC approach does work with individuals at the ‘sharp end’ of
prevention who are more closely aligned to the structure of the extremist
narrative (and, here, who are also under-resourced through a lack of
secondary education). However, the gains in IC for Subgroup 1 are more
modest than with the other groups, and these participants would have
benefitted from more time and personal mentoring, had the schedule allowed.
We originally developed Being Muslim Being British for primary prevention,
for anyone potentially vulnerable to radicalization in the early stages. In this
pilot of Being Kenyan Being Muslim, the stakes have been raised with the
inclusion of participants who have been members of a terrorist group. We
have recently argued in a U.S. State Department White Paper, that secondary
and tertiary prevention needs to take a multi-agency approach, to which the
IC method can bring an important contribution.42 In a further roll-out of
BKBM seeking to include violent extremists (as in this pilot), the IC
intervention will need to be part of a joined-up strategy with other agencies
for ongoing support. Recruiting a mixed group of participants including
target audience and prevention workers, as in this project, works to kickstart a
multi-agency approach, as well as eliciting intense discussion and
involvement. We also advise that one-to-one IC mentoring is provided for
extremely vulnerable participants in addition to the BKBM course to help
them consolidate the gains that the IC sessions produce. Normal practice is to
41
42

Gambetta, Diego and Steffen Hertog, Engineers of Jihad.
Jose Liht and Sara Savage, “Preventing Violent Extremism with Value Complexity.”
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run an IC intervention over a four to eight week duration (not over days as in
this pilot, necessitated by schedule and budget constraints), and to assign
practical weekly homework tasks. Longer periods for processing the material
helps participants to reflect upon and integrate the new ways of thinking. It is
also normal practice for group size to be capped at twelve to sixteen
participants, rather than twenty-four as in this pilot. Despire these
challenges, including the need for ongoing translations between English,
Swahili and Somali during each session, it is encouraging that the BKBM
intervention did show significant IC gains.
Participant Presentations
Through empirical assessments of other IC courses (I SEE for Scotland, an
anti-sectarian IC course, and Conflict Transformation, a course for various
inter-group conflicts, and Being Muslim Being British), we have observed two
kinds of effects: (1) changes to the less-than-conscious structure of thinking,
measured by IC coding, and (2) learned cognitive, emotional and interpersonal skills.43 To assess the latter effect, we analysed participant
presentations for evidence of learning about and application of IC skills. The
participant presentations at the end of the course make it easier for
participants to reveal the extent of their IC learning as they have time to
prepare what they want to share (prepared verbal data is similar to the
speeches, letters, parliamentary proceedings that are usually used for
integrative complexity research).44
We qualitatively analyzed the verbatim transcripts of twenty-two
presentations for presence of understanding and application of (1)
differentiation, (2) integration, (3) social intelligence (empathy for others,
insight into self or others, greater emotional control) and (4) confidence in
applying IC skills.
Differentiation
All participant presentations showed instances of participants applying the
construct of differentiation: the ability to perceive multiple dimensions to an
issue and that there is some validity in different views, exceptions to the rule,
and changes over time. Examples include:
“IC is about how we perceive the world. Seeing through our religious
faith, not just blind faith, but using both head and heart. IC allows you
to see the shadows, to see both points of view. Active listening helps
you to interact well.” (Subgroup 3 participant)
“Religion leads us to the right path. Religion makes you strong. But
there are situations where you should sidestep your religion. It
doesn’t mean … it doesn’t make you a real Muslim… its not just about
wearing a hijab, covering yourself. Yes, you should do that but there
are places where you shouldn’t walk with your hijab. You should
balance your life and religion and other people’s culture.” (Subgroup 3
participant)
“I’ve learned to be an active listener, even with those whom I disagree.
Understanding different community values and cultures. It will help
43

For information about I SEE course, see: http://iseeinscotland.org.uk
and www.ICTcambridge.org, Conflict Transformation page.
44 Suedfeld, Leighton and Conway, “Integrative Complexity and Cognitive Management...”
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you avoid conflict. Thinking for yourself. I am the one who is doing
the deciding.” (Subgroup 1 participant)
“In Kenya we have different community of different origins, different
religious leaders. We need IC for Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Jews so
that religious leaders can understand among themselves and have
common ground.” (Subgroup 2 participant)
“When we love Muslims we are not saying that what they are all doing
is right. It is a sin to kill. It is a sin to do what they are doing, like
Westgate.” (Subgroup 4 participant)
“We have to be able to evaluate what section we are in. Are we in low
IC? - which is very difficult and dangerous, like black and white, about
us and them, and it is so easy to create conflict. And that is where the
world is at now.” (Subgroup 3 participant)
“IC is about how we see. It will differentiate depending on whether you
are male or female and where you come from.” (Subgroup 3
participant)
Integration
Fifty percent of participant presentations showed application of the construct
of integration, suggesting more participants understood the higher levels of IC
than was evident in the test conditions of the Pre and Post testing:
“How religion and science integrate. Some people believe religious is
the only source. Some people say science is the source. Each see from
a different perspective, from different directions.” (Subgroup 2
participant)
“Like thinking outside the box. Finding the deep values, principles,
underlying each view. That is the time we can come to an integration.
So that is the most time that came to me, like weaving [integrating]
our thoughts together, weaving our thinking together, weaving our
relationships and values together. It goes beyond our religion, goes
beyond our relationships and our values and it thelps me in our day to
day life.” (Subgroup 3 participant)
“Science and the truth between the two. Which one is the truth? IC is
about finding out how science and religion complement one another.
The equal aspect betweeen religion and science.” (Subgroup 4
participant)
“This IC, thinking beyond, this thinking about my religion that I just
took for granted, like halal. You are just looking for the label halal on
the packet of seed but you never know why, what is the criterion. Are
they qualified to judge this? Then there is this thing about religion
and the Western world – how do you view Islam from the Western
world?” (Subgroup 3 participant)
“I just learned that you can integrate and explain the two worlds and
come up with a better world.” (Subgroup 3 participant)
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“I have learned a lot - how to solve interconnected problems and
complex ideas. Before you impose, you listen first.” (Subgroup 2
participant)
Based on the number of instances of differentiation and integration per
presentation, Participant Presentation Scores correlated highly and
significantly with IC Post test scores, strengthening our confidence in the
effectiveness of the course.
Social / Emotional Intelligence
77 percent of participants evidenced felt they experienced increases in their
social and emotional intelligence through the course:
“The first day I was scared but I’ve interacted with colleagues and
become motivated. It taught me how to relate to society, how to relate
to the rest of the public.” (Subgroup 1 participant, former al Shabaab
member)
“It’s about why is this person doing this? Then you can try to calm the
situation so that you can handle it bettter.” (Subgroup 4 participant)
“It taught me I can manage my anger.” (Subgroup 1 participant,
former al Shabaab member)
“I learned about Fitna and Islam. Fitna is bad – it leads to hatred and
its can spread in the community and lead to the dissolution of the
community.” (Subgroup 1, former Al Shabaab member)
“IC gives me another eye opener, gives me more inspiration. Gives me
knowledge to live with other people as Muslim, to live with my
brothers who are Christian. How I can stay with them like
brotherhood.” (Subgroup 3 participant)
“It taught me how to share ideas with people, how to live with different
faiths and to overcome hatred.” (Subgroup 3 participant)
“We need to be together so that we love one another.” (Subgroup 1
participant, former al Shabaab member)
Confidence
Confidence in addressing the conflicts and value tensions that underpin
extremism through new skills and abilities was present in 100 percent of
participant presentations, for example:
“Now I can handle any situation, to accept other’s culture knowing we
are all different. We all have different perspectives. We shouldn’t
judge eachother but pick the good from each others’ perspective to
make something good.” (Subgroup 2 participant)
“I think this program will help. It changed my life, Ahumdulillah. I
want to change others who are out there. OK, they don’t know
anything about Pleasure and Purity.” (Subgroup 3 participant)
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“Listening to people who are fighting…Where I come from, we have
these kinds of situations everyday. People attacking you from all sides.
Not giving black and white in return. [This] gives me a feeling of
belonging. Giving me more hope.” (Subgroup 3 participant)
“Going through mirroring, validating, empathizing. Where to use it?
Where applicable? With friends. At work. Or when you are not able
to understand your friend. At home, especially with siblings when
they will not do as you say, voices are raised. With couples, it can
work. Domination – men bossing women. Use it. This brings youth
groups together, not polarizing.” (Subgroup 2 participant)
“If you can change one youth, and he changes two youth, and then he
changes two youth, then a lot will change…I want to have a job in this.”
(Subgroup 3 participant)
“…with this course I will use it in my community…I will give them the
hope of that awareness to continue what IC teaches me and what I
have learnt from that teaching…we are all human beings created
together, this course has given me hope for life, I must listen when my
temper is high…” (Subgroup 3)
Conflict Styles
The conflict style Avoid decreased, as did Compromise and Collaborate,
whereas Direct significantly increased. The previous conflict styles analysis
for Being Muslim Being British45 employed a qualitative coding frame based
on Kraybill’s five empirically derived constructs, and that research on young
British Muslims showed a significant increase in the combined scores of
Compromise and Collaboration conflict styles.46 The different patterns
shown here with BKBM may be due to the different instruments used: a
qualitative analysis of spontaneous group discussion data was employed for
Being Muslim Being British; the Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire was used
for BKBM. However, it does seem that differences between the UK and
Kenyan cultural contexts also play a role here, impacting how conflict is
perceived and what is deemed appropriate in the Kenyan context.
It may be that the Collaboration conflict style, which builds on the hope of
win/win solutions achieved for both parties, seems unrealistic in the
Eastleigh, Nairobi context given the widespread lack of trust between groups
and potential danger in daily public life (all four conflict scenarios concerned
events played out in public). The Compromise conflict style, giving away
something in order to get something, may seem akin to the practice of
resolving disputes through giving baksheesh, a problem that was discussed by
large majority of participants, speaking of endemic corruption and the
ubiquitous nature of the giving and receiving of bribes.
Another interpretation is suggested by the strong, negative correlation
between years in Islamic religious education and the Direct conflict style in
the Pre test. This relationship noticeably lessens in the Post test (though
remains non significant). It may be that traditional Islamic teaching
concerning submission to fate (Allah), conforming to duty and controlling
self-expression, serves to ‘suppress’ the Direct pro-social conflict style in the
45
46

Ibid.
Ronald S. Kraybill and Wright, Evelyn The Little Book of Cool Tools for Hot Topics.
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Pre test. It is arguable that values of traditional religious self-transcendence
are in tension with the Direct conflict style in which the person clearly states
their viewpoint regarding a conflict, and considers the issue important
enough to stick their neck out, even if there is cost to the relationships
involved.47 It may be that the ethic of self-transcendence taught in Islamic
education is moderated by the IC intervention, which then allowed
participants in the Post-test to choose the Direct conflict style, perhaps
because it was deemed was more effective within the Kenyan context. If this
interpretation is correct, this accords with participants’ general sense of
empowerment and confidence at the end of the course, as well as IC as a
moderator of years in Islamic religious education.
The developers of the conflict styles constructs originally viewed Collaborate
as the best, most adaptive conflict style, as it seeks win /win solutions using
creative thinking.48 (Compromise enables both parties to get some but not
most of what they want.) The preference for Collaboration as the ‘best’
conflict style was later amended, as it became evident that all five conflict
styles can be used positively for resolving conflict. What matters is the ability
to choose the conflict style that best suits the situation (a form of metacognition), and having pro-social motivations and social intelligence in using
the conflict styles. This parallels research that acknowledges that high levels
of IC are not universal goods given the cognitive costs of highly complex
thinking in certain situations.49 For both conflict styles and IC, it seems what
is needed is meta-cognition to enable flexibility and awareness of context.
Because the IC of extremist ideology is so low, the first step in countering
extremism is to enable participants to raise their IC. But thereafter, the more
advanced skills of IC concern meta-cognition to assess the situation for the
most appropriate level of IC.
For a future roll-out of the course, BKBM course gains can be strengthened, as
argued above, through using the standard course run over weeks (not days)
along with one-to-one mentoring for highly vulnerable participants. The final
course version is planned to include tensions between Christians and
Muslims, the gap between the (newly) rich and the poor, and lack of security,
all of which are part of the context of radicalization. Community settings will
continue to provide good contexts for disseminating BKBM, but we think that
in the future the widest dissemination of IC courses will be through schools
(for ages 11 and upwards). We are already working in schools in several
countries, and early results show that the most disruptive students undergo
significant behavioural changes (independently observed by teachers and
head teachers). Our next project is taking place in a large number of schools
in south Asia, and this provides an opportunity for control groups and
longitudinal research.

Conclusion
The positive participant response in conjunction with the empirical data
indicates that BKBM was a success in Kenya. BKBM’s method of exposing
participants to a multiplicity of value priorities through group activities
structured to enable participants to explore the implications of the whole of
the value spectrum was measured through pre and post testing. The written
47 Shalom H. Schwartz and Klaus Boehnke, "Evaluating the structure of human values with
confirmatory factor analysis," Journal of Research in Personality 38:3 (2004).
48 Ibid.
49 Suedfeld, Leighton and Conway, “Integrative Complexity and Cognitive Management…”
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data showed, as hypothesized, significant gains in IC, the ability to think in
more complex ways about the issues relevant to extremism, measured by IC,
followed by even greater IC understanding and application evident in the
participant presentations. According to the integrative complexity literature,
and in line with RIVE research and prevention initiatives, such changes
predict pro-social rather than violent means to resolve conflict. Participants’
significant shift towards Direct as a conflict style is in line with the new
confidence and empowerment participants expressed. The overall picture
supports the efficacy of this IC and values complexity based intervention,
designed originally for broad-based primary prevention, but here also shown
to be an effective model for former al Shabaab members as well.
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Appendix: Pre and Post Testing Instruments.
Paragraph Completion Test
1. When I think about MY community (group) (see A, above)… (fill in the
large blank section)
2. When I think about the OTHER group (see B, above)… (fill in the
large blank section)
SIP Scale (Scale 1 - 5; Strongly Agree = 5, Strongly Disagree = 1; items
balanced for order effects Pre and Post)
a. My group often has to do what other more powerful groups want
b. My group is often treated unfairly by more powerful groups
c. Members of my group are easily accepted into influential or powerful
groups in Kenya
d. My group deserves to have a stronger position
e. The strength of my group is increasing

Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire
Pre test
Scenario 1:
You are walking down the street at night in Eastleigh and someone you don’t
like is on the other side of the street, walking towards you. You are alone. He
is with a couple of other men. They are talking about you and looking in your
direction. They get louder and shout insults at you. You can tell he is trying
to get a reaction out of you. He and the other men are laughing. What do you
do?
For each scenario, 5 options. Rank each option according to whether you
would or would not react this way. (Scale 1 – 5; 1 = Yes, I would do this for
sure, 5 = No, I would never do this)
a. You look the other way (like, into a shop window) and hope they’ll
keep walking past you. Your goal is to avoid the situation and forget
about it.
b. You cross the street and confront them. They’re being foolish and a
pain. You tell them to stop now. Your goal is to solve the problem by
being as direct as possible.
c. You cross the street smiling, asking how they’re doing. You want to be
friends, not make a big deal of it. Your goal is to keep the peace and
the relationship at all costs.
d. You go up to them, smiling a little. You say, ‘Yeah, that was a good
joke — but I’m standing next to you, you don’t have to shout’. You
smile to break the tension. Your goal is to break the hostility by
surprising them with friendliness but at the same time telling them to
stop shouting.
e. You don’t like what they’re saying, and you let them know that, but
you keep walking on. They know that you could retaliate if you wanted
to, but you don’t. Your goal is to reach a compromise: everyone has
freedom of expression – live and let live.
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Scenario 2:
You are waiting in line to get on a bus, and there is an argument between the
bus driver, a Kenyan, and a passenger whom you know from your community.
The bus driver is angry and is making the Somali get off the bus. You wonder
what the Somali did wrong, and yet you also know that there is often unfair
prejudice against Somalians. What do you do?
a. You decide that you should calm the situation by asking your fellow
Somali to make peace with the bus driver and to comply.
b. You intervene straight away to confront the bullying bus driver;
meanwhile you call your Somali friends who are in line for the bus to
give you back up.
c. You don’t want to inflame this trivial-looking situation, so you stay out
of it. You wander off to catch another bus.
d. You speak to the bus driver in Swahili and ask him what the problem
is. Then you speak in Somali to the Somalian and ask him what the
problem is. You offer to help both parties get what they need, with
neither losing face.
e. You think that maybe the bus driver is inflating the cost of the ticket
because the Somali has a lot of luggage, so you suggest that the Somali
should pay just a little bit more for his ticket, but not the full price the
bus driver is demanding.

Conflict Scenarios Questionnaire
Post test
Scenario 1:
It’s the Africa Nations Cup game, and Somalia is playing against _______
team (you decide which team this is). You are in a bus full of supporters of
your team. A bus from the rival team comes up alongside your bus. E veryone
in both buses goes wild, shouting, pounding on the windows. Then someone
throws something at the rival team bus. This is dangerous. What do you do?
a. You say to the person, “Hey,” throw something at me. Whatever they
throw at you, you then quietly pass it to someone else and say- pass it
on. Then you start passing something else. Several things are now
being passed around the bus in a friendly way.
b. You roll down the window and tell the fans in the other bus they can
throw something back at your bus.
c. You sink down in your seat and close your eyes. You don’t want
anything to do with this.
d. You say directly to the man in your bus who is throwing things and tell
him to stop it. Does he want to be responsible if the bus gets pulled
over by the police?
e. You put your arm around the man throwing things and tell him you
don’t want him to get in trouble. Looking around the bus, you say:
We’re all friends and we stick together.
Scenario 2:
Walking home, you see some young kids from your neighborhood hanging out
on the street. You see them stopping another young kid – a youngster from
another part of town, from a different background - and picking a fight with
him. What do you do?
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a. You walk up to the kids and tell them to stop right now. They should
be ashamed of themselves. They need to go home this instant.
b. You walk past. It’s none of your business. Their parents should sort
them out. The kid will be okay.
c. You say, ‘Hey, Kid (getting beaten up), what are you getting beaten up
for?’ To the others you say: ‘Have a go at me! Oh no, you don’t know
what you’re doing, try this (showing them Aikido martial arts moves)!’
d. You say, ‘Come on kids. Say you’re sorry. Shake hands. You’re all
friends now, right? No one is hurt, right? Go home’.
e. You say, ‘Okay, now this guy who’s getting beaten up gets to have a
punch at each of you. Who’s first?’
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